impls -> inline, adapters -> remote (#381)

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Ashwin Bharambe 2024-11-06 14:54:05 -08:00 committed by GitHub
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169 changed files with 106 additions and 105 deletions

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# Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
# All rights reserved.
#
# This source code is licensed under the terms described in the LICENSE file in
# the root directory of this source tree.
from .config import LlamaGuardShieldConfig, SafetyConfig # noqa: F401
async def get_provider_impl(config: SafetyConfig, deps):
from .safety import MetaReferenceSafetyImpl
assert isinstance(config, SafetyConfig), f"Unexpected config type: {type(config)}"
impl = MetaReferenceSafetyImpl(config, deps)
await impl.initialize()
return impl

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# Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
# All rights reserved.
#
# This source code is licensed under the terms described in the LICENSE file in
# the root directory of this source tree.
from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
from typing import List
from llama_models.llama3.api.datatypes import interleaved_text_media_as_str, Message
from pydantic import BaseModel
from llama_stack.apis.safety import * # noqa: F403
CANNED_RESPONSE_TEXT = "I can't answer that. Can I help with something else?"
# TODO: clean this up; just remove this type completely
class ShieldResponse(BaseModel):
is_violation: bool
violation_type: Optional[str] = None
violation_return_message: Optional[str] = None
# TODO: this is a caller / agent concern
class OnViolationAction(Enum):
IGNORE = 0
WARN = 1
RAISE = 2
class ShieldBase(ABC):
def __init__(
self,
on_violation_action: OnViolationAction = OnViolationAction.RAISE,
):
self.on_violation_action = on_violation_action
@abstractmethod
async def run(self, messages: List[Message]) -> ShieldResponse:
raise NotImplementedError()
def message_content_as_str(message: Message) -> str:
return interleaved_text_media_as_str(message.content)
class TextShield(ShieldBase):
def convert_messages_to_text(self, messages: List[Message]) -> str:
return "\n".join([message_content_as_str(m) for m in messages])
async def run(self, messages: List[Message]) -> ShieldResponse:
text = self.convert_messages_to_text(messages)
return await self.run_impl(text)
@abstractmethod
async def run_impl(self, text: str) -> ShieldResponse:
raise NotImplementedError()

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# Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
# All rights reserved.
#
# This source code is licensed under the terms described in the LICENSE file in
# the root directory of this source tree.
from enum import Enum
from typing import List, Optional
from llama_models.sku_list import CoreModelId, safety_models
from pydantic import BaseModel, field_validator
class PromptGuardType(Enum):
injection = "injection"
jailbreak = "jailbreak"
class LlamaGuardShieldConfig(BaseModel):
model: str = "Llama-Guard-3-1B"
excluded_categories: List[str] = []
@field_validator("model")
@classmethod
def validate_model(cls, model: str) -> str:
permitted_models = [
m.descriptor()
for m in safety_models()
if (
m.core_model_id
in {
CoreModelId.llama_guard_3_8b,
CoreModelId.llama_guard_3_1b,
CoreModelId.llama_guard_3_11b_vision,
}
)
]
if model not in permitted_models:
raise ValueError(
f"Invalid model: {model}. Must be one of {permitted_models}"
)
return model
class SafetyConfig(BaseModel):
llama_guard_shield: Optional[LlamaGuardShieldConfig] = None
enable_prompt_guard: Optional[bool] = False

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# Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
# All rights reserved.
#
# This source code is licensed under the terms described in the LICENSE file in
# the root directory of this source tree.
import re
from string import Template
from typing import List, Optional
from llama_models.llama3.api.datatypes import * # noqa: F403
from llama_stack.apis.inference import * # noqa: F403
from .base import CANNED_RESPONSE_TEXT, OnViolationAction, ShieldBase, ShieldResponse
SAFE_RESPONSE = "safe"
_INSTANCE = None
CAT_VIOLENT_CRIMES = "Violent Crimes"
CAT_NON_VIOLENT_CRIMES = "Non-Violent Crimes"
CAT_SEX_CRIMES = "Sex Crimes"
CAT_CHILD_EXPLOITATION = "Child Exploitation"
CAT_DEFAMATION = "Defamation"
CAT_SPECIALIZED_ADVICE = "Specialized Advice"
CAT_PRIVACY = "Privacy"
CAT_INTELLECTUAL_PROPERTY = "Intellectual Property"
CAT_INDISCRIMINATE_WEAPONS = "Indiscriminate Weapons"
CAT_HATE = "Hate"
CAT_SELF_HARM = "Self-Harm"
CAT_SEXUAL_CONTENT = "Sexual Content"
CAT_ELECTIONS = "Elections"
CAT_CODE_INTERPRETER_ABUSE = "Code Interpreter Abuse"
SAFETY_CATEGORIES_TO_CODE_MAP = {
CAT_VIOLENT_CRIMES: "S1",
CAT_NON_VIOLENT_CRIMES: "S2",
CAT_SEX_CRIMES: "S3",
CAT_CHILD_EXPLOITATION: "S4",
CAT_DEFAMATION: "S5",
CAT_SPECIALIZED_ADVICE: "S6",
CAT_PRIVACY: "S7",
CAT_INTELLECTUAL_PROPERTY: "S8",
CAT_INDISCRIMINATE_WEAPONS: "S9",
CAT_HATE: "S10",
CAT_SELF_HARM: "S11",
CAT_SEXUAL_CONTENT: "S12",
CAT_ELECTIONS: "S13",
CAT_CODE_INTERPRETER_ABUSE: "S14",
}
DEFAULT_LG_V3_SAFETY_CATEGORIES = [
CAT_VIOLENT_CRIMES,
CAT_NON_VIOLENT_CRIMES,
CAT_SEX_CRIMES,
CAT_CHILD_EXPLOITATION,
CAT_DEFAMATION,
CAT_SPECIALIZED_ADVICE,
CAT_PRIVACY,
CAT_INTELLECTUAL_PROPERTY,
CAT_INDISCRIMINATE_WEAPONS,
CAT_HATE,
CAT_SELF_HARM,
CAT_SEXUAL_CONTENT,
CAT_ELECTIONS,
]
MODEL_TO_SAFETY_CATEGORIES_MAP = {
CoreModelId.llama_guard_3_8b.value: (
DEFAULT_LG_V3_SAFETY_CATEGORIES + [CAT_CODE_INTERPRETER_ABUSE]
),
CoreModelId.llama_guard_3_1b.value: DEFAULT_LG_V3_SAFETY_CATEGORIES,
CoreModelId.llama_guard_3_11b_vision.value: DEFAULT_LG_V3_SAFETY_CATEGORIES,
}
PROMPT_TASK = "Task: Check if there is unsafe content in '$agent_type' messages in conversations according our safety policy with the below categories."
SAFETY_CATEGORIES = """
<BEGIN UNSAFE CONTENT CATEGORIES>
$categories
<END UNSAFE CONTENT CATEGORIES>
"""
PROMPT_CONVERSATION = """
<BEGIN CONVERSATION>
$conversations
<END CONVERSATION>
"""
PROMPT_INSTRUCTIONS = """
Provide your safety assessment for ONLY THE LAST $agent_type message in the above conversation:
- First line must read 'safe' or 'unsafe'.
- If unsafe, a second line must include a comma-separated list of violated categories."""
PROMPT_TEMPLATE = Template(
f"{PROMPT_TASK}{SAFETY_CATEGORIES}{PROMPT_CONVERSATION}{PROMPT_INSTRUCTIONS}"
)
class LlamaGuardShield(ShieldBase):
def __init__(
self,
model: str,
inference_api: Inference,
excluded_categories: List[str] = None,
on_violation_action: OnViolationAction = OnViolationAction.RAISE,
):
super().__init__(on_violation_action)
if excluded_categories is None:
excluded_categories = []
assert len(excluded_categories) == 0 or all(
x in SAFETY_CATEGORIES_TO_CODE_MAP.values() for x in excluded_categories
), "Invalid categories in excluded categories. Expected format is ['S1', 'S2', ..]"
if model not in MODEL_TO_SAFETY_CATEGORIES_MAP:
raise ValueError(f"Unsupported model: {model}")
self.model = model
self.inference_api = inference_api
self.excluded_categories = excluded_categories
def check_unsafe_response(self, response: str) -> Optional[str]:
match = re.match(r"^unsafe\n(.*)$", response)
if match:
# extracts the unsafe code
extracted = match.group(1)
return extracted
return None
def get_safety_categories(self) -> List[str]:
excluded_categories = self.excluded_categories
if set(excluded_categories) == set(SAFETY_CATEGORIES_TO_CODE_MAP.values()):
excluded_categories = []
final_categories = []
all_categories = MODEL_TO_SAFETY_CATEGORIES_MAP[self.model]
for cat in all_categories:
cat_code = SAFETY_CATEGORIES_TO_CODE_MAP[cat]
if cat_code in excluded_categories:
continue
final_categories.append(f"{cat_code}: {cat}.")
return final_categories
def validate_messages(self, messages: List[Message]) -> None:
if len(messages) == 0:
raise ValueError("Messages must not be empty")
if messages[0].role != Role.user.value:
raise ValueError("Messages must start with user")
if len(messages) >= 2 and (
messages[0].role == Role.user.value and messages[1].role == Role.user.value
):
messages = messages[1:]
for i in range(1, len(messages)):
if messages[i].role == messages[i - 1].role:
raise ValueError(
f"Messages must alternate between user and assistant. Message {i} has the same role as message {i - 1}"
)
return messages
async def run(self, messages: List[Message]) -> ShieldResponse:
messages = self.validate_messages(messages)
if self.model == CoreModelId.llama_guard_3_11b_vision.value:
shield_input_message = self.build_vision_shield_input(messages)
else:
shield_input_message = self.build_text_shield_input(messages)
# TODO: llama-stack inference protocol has issues with non-streaming inference code
content = ""
async for chunk in await self.inference_api.chat_completion(
model=self.model,
messages=[shield_input_message],
stream=True,
):
event = chunk.event
if event.event_type == ChatCompletionResponseEventType.progress:
assert isinstance(event.delta, str)
content += event.delta
content = content.strip()
shield_response = self.get_shield_response(content)
return shield_response
def build_text_shield_input(self, messages: List[Message]) -> UserMessage:
return UserMessage(content=self.build_prompt(messages))
def build_vision_shield_input(self, messages: List[Message]) -> UserMessage:
conversation = []
most_recent_img = None
for m in messages[::-1]:
if isinstance(m.content, str):
conversation.append(m)
elif isinstance(m.content, ImageMedia):
if most_recent_img is None and m.role == Role.user.value:
most_recent_img = m.content
conversation.append(m)
elif isinstance(m.content, list):
content = []
for c in m.content:
if isinstance(c, str):
content.append(c)
elif isinstance(c, ImageMedia):
if most_recent_img is None and m.role == Role.user.value:
most_recent_img = c
content.append(c)
else:
raise ValueError(f"Unknown content type: {c}")
conversation.append(UserMessage(content=content))
else:
raise ValueError(f"Unknown content type: {m.content}")
prompt = []
if most_recent_img is not None:
prompt.append(most_recent_img)
prompt.append(self.build_prompt(conversation[::-1]))
return UserMessage(content=prompt)
def build_prompt(self, messages: List[Message]) -> str:
categories = self.get_safety_categories()
categories_str = "\n".join(categories)
conversations_str = "\n\n".join(
[
f"{m.role.capitalize()}: {interleaved_text_media_as_str(m.content)}"
for m in messages
]
)
return PROMPT_TEMPLATE.substitute(
agent_type=messages[-1].role.capitalize(),
categories=categories_str,
conversations=conversations_str,
)
def get_shield_response(self, response: str) -> ShieldResponse:
response = response.strip()
if response == SAFE_RESPONSE:
return ShieldResponse(is_violation=False)
unsafe_code = self.check_unsafe_response(response)
if unsafe_code:
unsafe_code_list = unsafe_code.split(",")
if set(unsafe_code_list).issubset(set(self.excluded_categories)):
return ShieldResponse(is_violation=False)
return ShieldResponse(
is_violation=True,
violation_type=unsafe_code,
violation_return_message=CANNED_RESPONSE_TEXT,
)
raise ValueError(f"Unexpected response: {response}")

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# Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
# All rights reserved.
#
# This source code is licensed under the terms described in the LICENSE file in
# the root directory of this source tree.
from enum import auto, Enum
from typing import List
import torch
from llama_models.llama3.api.datatypes import Message
from termcolor import cprint
from .base import message_content_as_str, OnViolationAction, ShieldResponse, TextShield
class PromptGuardShield(TextShield):
class Mode(Enum):
INJECTION = auto()
JAILBREAK = auto()
_instances = {}
_model_cache = None
@staticmethod
def instance(
model_dir: str,
threshold: float = 0.9,
temperature: float = 1.0,
mode: "PromptGuardShield.Mode" = Mode.JAILBREAK,
on_violation_action=OnViolationAction.RAISE,
) -> "PromptGuardShield":
action_value = on_violation_action.value
key = (model_dir, threshold, temperature, mode, action_value)
if key not in PromptGuardShield._instances:
PromptGuardShield._instances[key] = PromptGuardShield(
model_dir=model_dir,
threshold=threshold,
temperature=temperature,
mode=mode,
on_violation_action=on_violation_action,
)
return PromptGuardShield._instances[key]
def __init__(
self,
model_dir: str,
threshold: float = 0.9,
temperature: float = 1.0,
mode: "PromptGuardShield.Mode" = Mode.JAILBREAK,
on_violation_action: OnViolationAction = OnViolationAction.RAISE,
):
super().__init__(on_violation_action)
assert (
model_dir is not None
), "Must provide a model directory for prompt injection shield"
if temperature <= 0:
raise ValueError("Temperature must be greater than 0")
self.device = "cuda"
if PromptGuardShield._model_cache is None:
from transformers import AutoModelForSequenceClassification, AutoTokenizer
# load model and tokenizer
tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained(model_dir)
model = AutoModelForSequenceClassification.from_pretrained(
model_dir, device_map=self.device
)
PromptGuardShield._model_cache = (tokenizer, model)
self.tokenizer, self.model = PromptGuardShield._model_cache
self.temperature = temperature
self.threshold = threshold
self.mode = mode
def convert_messages_to_text(self, messages: List[Message]) -> str:
return message_content_as_str(messages[-1])
async def run_impl(self, text: str) -> ShieldResponse:
# run model on messages and return response
inputs = self.tokenizer(text, return_tensors="pt")
inputs = {name: tensor.to(self.model.device) for name, tensor in inputs.items()}
with torch.no_grad():
outputs = self.model(**inputs)
logits = outputs[0]
probabilities = torch.softmax(logits / self.temperature, dim=-1)
score_embedded = probabilities[0, 1].item()
score_malicious = probabilities[0, 2].item()
cprint(
f"Ran PromptGuardShield and got Scores: Embedded: {score_embedded}, Malicious: {score_malicious}",
color="magenta",
)
if self.mode == self.Mode.INJECTION and (
score_embedded + score_malicious > self.threshold
):
return ShieldResponse(
is_violation=True,
violation_type=f"prompt_injection:embedded={score_embedded},malicious={score_malicious}",
violation_return_message="Sorry, I cannot do this.",
)
elif self.mode == self.Mode.JAILBREAK and score_malicious > self.threshold:
return ShieldResponse(
is_violation=True,
violation_type=f"prompt_injection:malicious={score_malicious}",
violation_return_message="Sorry, I cannot do this.",
)
return ShieldResponse(
is_violation=False,
)
class JailbreakShield(PromptGuardShield):
def __init__(
self,
model_dir: str,
threshold: float = 0.9,
temperature: float = 1.0,
on_violation_action: OnViolationAction = OnViolationAction.RAISE,
):
super().__init__(
model_dir=model_dir,
threshold=threshold,
temperature=temperature,
mode=PromptGuardShield.Mode.JAILBREAK,
on_violation_action=on_violation_action,
)
class InjectionShield(PromptGuardShield):
def __init__(
self,
model_dir: str,
threshold: float = 0.9,
temperature: float = 1.0,
on_violation_action: OnViolationAction = OnViolationAction.RAISE,
):
super().__init__(
model_dir=model_dir,
threshold=threshold,
temperature=temperature,
mode=PromptGuardShield.Mode.INJECTION,
on_violation_action=on_violation_action,
)

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# Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
# All rights reserved.
#
# This source code is licensed under the terms described in the LICENSE file in
# the root directory of this source tree.
from typing import Any, Dict, List
from llama_stack.distribution.utils.model_utils import model_local_dir
from llama_stack.apis.inference import * # noqa: F403
from llama_stack.apis.safety import * # noqa: F403
from llama_models.llama3.api.datatypes import * # noqa: F403
from llama_stack.distribution.datatypes import Api
from llama_stack.providers.datatypes import ShieldsProtocolPrivate
from .base import OnViolationAction, ShieldBase
from .config import SafetyConfig
from .llama_guard import LlamaGuardShield
from .prompt_guard import InjectionShield, JailbreakShield, PromptGuardShield
PROMPT_GUARD_MODEL = "Prompt-Guard-86M"
class MetaReferenceSafetyImpl(Safety, ShieldsProtocolPrivate):
def __init__(self, config: SafetyConfig, deps) -> None:
self.config = config
self.inference_api = deps[Api.inference]
self.available_shields = []
if config.llama_guard_shield:
self.available_shields.append(ShieldType.llama_guard.value)
if config.enable_prompt_guard:
self.available_shields.append(ShieldType.prompt_guard.value)
async def initialize(self) -> None:
if self.config.enable_prompt_guard:
model_dir = model_local_dir(PROMPT_GUARD_MODEL)
_ = PromptGuardShield.instance(model_dir)
async def shutdown(self) -> None:
pass
async def register_shield(self, shield: ShieldDef) -> None:
raise ValueError("Registering dynamic shields is not supported")
async def list_shields(self) -> List[ShieldDef]:
return [
ShieldDef(
identifier=shield_type,
shield_type=shield_type,
params={},
)
for shield_type in self.available_shields
]
async def run_shield(
self,
shield_type: str,
messages: List[Message],
params: Dict[str, Any] = None,
) -> RunShieldResponse:
shield_def = await self.shield_store.get_shield(shield_type)
if not shield_def:
raise ValueError(f"Unknown shield {shield_type}")
shield = self.get_shield_impl(shield_def)
messages = messages.copy()
# some shields like llama-guard require the first message to be a user message
# since this might be a tool call, first role might not be user
if len(messages) > 0 and messages[0].role != Role.user.value:
messages[0] = UserMessage(content=messages[0].content)
# TODO: we can refactor ShieldBase, etc. to be inline with the API types
res = await shield.run(messages)
violation = None
if res.is_violation and shield.on_violation_action != OnViolationAction.IGNORE:
violation = SafetyViolation(
violation_level=(
ViolationLevel.ERROR
if shield.on_violation_action == OnViolationAction.RAISE
else ViolationLevel.WARN
),
user_message=res.violation_return_message,
metadata={
"violation_type": res.violation_type,
},
)
return RunShieldResponse(violation=violation)
def get_shield_impl(self, shield: ShieldDef) -> ShieldBase:
if shield.shield_type == ShieldType.llama_guard.value:
cfg = self.config.llama_guard_shield
return LlamaGuardShield(
model=cfg.model,
inference_api=self.inference_api,
excluded_categories=cfg.excluded_categories,
)
elif shield.shield_type == ShieldType.prompt_guard.value:
model_dir = model_local_dir(PROMPT_GUARD_MODEL)
subtype = shield.params.get("prompt_guard_type", "injection")
if subtype == "injection":
return InjectionShield.instance(model_dir)
elif subtype == "jailbreak":
return JailbreakShield.instance(model_dir)
else:
raise ValueError(f"Unknown prompt guard type: {subtype}")
else:
raise ValueError(f"Unknown shield type: {shield.shield_type}")