allow setting allowed routes on proxy

This commit is contained in:
Ishaan Jaff 2024-09-03 13:59:31 -07:00
parent 88d18c7340
commit cf66ca89b9
4 changed files with 122 additions and 74 deletions

View file

@ -40,22 +40,6 @@ else:
all_routes = LiteLLMRoutes.openai_routes.value + LiteLLMRoutes.management_routes.value
def is_request_body_safe(request_body: dict) -> bool:
"""
Check if the request body is safe.
A malicious user can set the api_base to their own domain and invoke POST /chat/completions to intercept and steal the OpenAI API key.
Relevant issue: https://huntr.com/bounties/4001e1a2-7b7a-4776-a3ae-e6692ec3d997
"""
banned_params = ["api_base", "base_url"]
for param in banned_params:
if param in request_body:
raise ValueError(f"BadRequest: {param} is not allowed in request body")
return True
def common_checks(
request_body: dict,
team_object: Optional[LiteLLM_TeamTable],

View file

@ -1,13 +1,123 @@
import re
import sys
import traceback
from typing import List, Optional, Tuple
from fastapi import Request
from fastapi import HTTPException, Request, status
from litellm._logging import verbose_proxy_logger
from litellm.proxy._types import *
def _get_request_ip_address(
request: Request, use_x_forwarded_for: Optional[bool] = False
) -> Optional[str]:
client_ip = None
if use_x_forwarded_for is True and "x-forwarded-for" in request.headers:
client_ip = request.headers["x-forwarded-for"]
elif request.client is not None:
client_ip = request.client.host
else:
client_ip = ""
return client_ip
def _check_valid_ip(
allowed_ips: Optional[List[str]],
request: Request,
use_x_forwarded_for: Optional[bool] = False,
) -> Tuple[bool, Optional[str]]:
"""
Returns if ip is allowed or not
"""
if allowed_ips is None: # if not set, assume true
return True, None
# if general_settings.get("use_x_forwarded_for") is True then use x-forwarded-for
client_ip = _get_request_ip_address(
request=request, use_x_forwarded_for=use_x_forwarded_for
)
# Check if IP address is allowed
if client_ip not in allowed_ips:
return False, client_ip
return True, client_ip
def is_request_body_safe(request_body: dict) -> bool:
"""
Check if the request body is safe.
A malicious user can set the api_base to their own domain and invoke POST /chat/completions to intercept and steal the OpenAI API key.
Relevant issue: https://huntr.com/bounties/4001e1a2-7b7a-4776-a3ae-e6692ec3d997
"""
banned_params = ["api_base", "base_url"]
for param in banned_params:
if param in request_body:
raise ValueError(f"BadRequest: {param} is not allowed in request body")
return True
async def pre_db_read_auth_checks(
request: Request,
request_data: dict,
route: str,
):
"""
1. Checks if request size is under max_request_size_mb (if set)
2. Check if request body is safe (example user has not set api_base in request body)
3. Check if IP address is allowed (if set)
4. Check if request route is an allowed route on the proxy (if set)
Returns:
- True
Raises:
- HTTPException if request fails initial auth checks
"""
from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import general_settings, premium_user
# Check 1. request size
await check_if_request_size_is_safe(request=request)
# Check 2. Request body is safe
is_request_body_safe(request_body=request_data)
# Check 3. Check if IP address is allowed
is_valid_ip, passed_in_ip = _check_valid_ip(
allowed_ips=general_settings.get("allowed_ips", None),
use_x_forwarded_for=general_settings.get("use_x_forwarded_for", False),
request=request,
)
if not is_valid_ip:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
detail=f"Access forbidden: IP address {passed_in_ip} not allowed.",
)
# Check 4. Check if request route is an allowed route on the proxy
if "allowed_routes" in general_settings:
_allowed_routes = general_settings["allowed_routes"]
if premium_user is not True:
verbose_proxy_logger.error(
f"Trying to set allowed_routes. This is an Enterprise feature. {CommonProxyErrors.not_premium_user.value}"
)
if route not in _allowed_routes:
verbose_proxy_logger.error(
f"Route {route} not in allowed_routes={_allowed_routes}"
)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
detail=f"Access forbidden: Route {route} not allowed",
)
def route_in_additonal_public_routes(current_route: str):
"""
Helper to check if the user defined public_routes on config.yaml

View file

@ -54,14 +54,15 @@ from litellm.proxy.auth.auth_checks import (
get_org_object,
get_team_object,
get_user_object,
is_request_body_safe,
log_to_opentelemetry,
)
from litellm.proxy.auth.auth_utils import (
_get_request_ip_address,
check_if_request_size_is_safe,
get_request_route,
is_llm_api_route,
is_pass_through_provider_route,
pre_db_read_auth_checks,
route_in_additonal_public_routes,
should_run_auth_on_pass_through_provider_route,
)
@ -128,25 +129,11 @@ async def user_api_key_auth(
route: str = get_request_route(request=request)
# get the request body
request_data = await _read_request_body(request=request)
is_request_body_safe(request_body=request_data)
### LiteLLM Enterprise Security Checks
# Check 1. Check if request size is under max_request_size_mb
# Check 2. FILTER IP ADDRESS
await check_if_request_size_is_safe(request=request)
is_valid_ip, passed_in_ip = _check_valid_ip(
allowed_ips=general_settings.get("allowed_ips", None),
use_x_forwarded_for=general_settings.get("use_x_forwarded_for", False),
await pre_db_read_auth_checks(
request_data=request_data,
request=request,
route=route,
)
if not is_valid_ip:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
detail=f"Access forbidden: IP address {passed_in_ip} not allowed.",
)
pass_through_endpoints: Optional[List[dict]] = general_settings.get(
"pass_through_endpoints", None
)
@ -200,6 +187,7 @@ async def user_api_key_auth(
```
"""
######## Route Checks Before Reading DB / Cache for "token" ################
if (
route in LiteLLMRoutes.public_routes.value
or route_in_additonal_public_routes(current_route=route)
@ -211,6 +199,9 @@ async def user_api_key_auth(
return UserAPIKeyAuth(
user_role=LitellmUserRoles.INTERNAL_USER_VIEW_ONLY
)
########## End of Route Checks Before Reading DB / Cache for "token" ########
if general_settings.get("enable_oauth2_auth", False) is True:
# return UserAPIKeyAuth object
# helper to check if the api_key is a valid oauth2 token
@ -1282,44 +1273,6 @@ def _get_user_role(
return role
def _get_request_ip_address(
request: Request, use_x_forwarded_for: Optional[bool] = False
) -> Optional[str]:
client_ip = None
if use_x_forwarded_for is True and "x-forwarded-for" in request.headers:
client_ip = request.headers["x-forwarded-for"]
elif request.client is not None:
client_ip = request.client.host
else:
client_ip = ""
return client_ip
def _check_valid_ip(
allowed_ips: Optional[List[str]],
request: Request,
use_x_forwarded_for: Optional[bool] = False,
) -> Tuple[bool, Optional[str]]:
"""
Returns if ip is allowed or not
"""
if allowed_ips is None: # if not set, assume true
return True, None
# if general_settings.get("use_x_forwarded_for") is True then use x-forwarded-for
client_ip = _get_request_ip_address(
request=request, use_x_forwarded_for=use_x_forwarded_for
)
# Check if IP address is allowed
if client_ip not in allowed_ips:
return False, client_ip
return True, client_ip
def get_api_key_from_custom_header(
request: Request, custom_litellm_key_header_name: str
):

View file

@ -13,3 +13,4 @@ litellm_settings:
general_settings:
master_key: sk-1234
custom_auth: example_config_yaml.custom_auth_basic.user_api_key_auth
allowed_routes: []